

Article

Mixed Proportional Representation in Election System of Bangladesh

Md. Saidur Rahaman^{*1} and Shahidur Rahman Shakib²

1. Associate Professor, Department of Business Administration, Metropolitan University, Bangladesh

2. Department of Computer Science & Engineering Metropolitan University, Bangladesh

shahidurrahmanshakib15@gmail.com

* Correspondence: saidur@metrouni.edu.bd

Abstract: This study examines the necessity for electoral reform in Bangladesh and proposes a Mixed Proportional Representation (MPR) system as a feasible alternative to the current First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) model. The existing system, despite its simplistic design, has led to unequal representation, political monopolization, and the insufficient representation of marginalized groups. The suggested MPR model can integrate constituency-based representation with proportional party lists to guarantee local accountability and enhanced political inclusion. The study elucidates the potential of MPR to foster pluralism, mitigate election distortion, and augment democratic involvement by drawing insights from comparative political systems. The research analyses the structural, political, and logistical obstacles that can impede the prompt implementation of this system in Bangladesh, including institutional unpreparedness, legislative limitations, and opposition from prevailing factions. A methodical implementation strategy, encompassing legal reforms, civic education, and international cooperation can help gradual transition to MPR, fostering a more egalitarian and robust democratic process in Bangladesh.

Keywords: Bangladesh; election; mixed PR; politics; reform; vote

1. Introduction

The First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) voting system in Bangladesh distorts democracy being unable to translate popular votes into fair parliamentary representation. In the 2001 general election, the BNP received 40.86% of votes but won 193 parliamentary seats (64.3% of total), while the Awami League received 40.21% of votes but won only 62 seats (20.7%). In 2008, the Awami League's 48.04% vote share won 230 seats (76.7% of Parliament), while the BNP's 32.5% support won only 30 seats (10%). These disproportionate results marginalize smaller parties, decrease voter turnout, and promote political exclusion (BBC 2024).

The Mixed Proportional Representation (MPR) system, which combines direct constituency elections with party-list proportional seats, ensures geographical and ideological diversity in parliament (Akash 2025; Jamuna TV 2024). This dual strategy will maintain local accountability while rectifying the FPTP system's major seat-vote imbalances, potentially making Bangladesh's electoral environment more inclusive and representational. Bangladesh should investigate MPR implementation because proportional and mixed voting systems are used worldwide. Over 100 democracies, including Germany, New Zealand, South Africa, and most Scandinavian countries, have embraced proportional representation to prevent winner-takes-all elections and maintain fair political competition (Hajjaj 2025).

The proposed MPR model would require voters to cast two ballots: one for their local constituency candidate (FPTP) and one for their political party (proportional). For example, the German Bundestag, which has 299 directly elected constituency seats and 299 proportionally allocated seats. Since 2013, compensatory mechanisms have made the seat count flexible to address overhang seats, and from the 2025 election, the Bundestag will have 630 seats under reformed proportional representation rules, ensuring geographic and ideological fairness. Several smaller political parties endorsed proportionate representation to remedy the electoral system's flaws and achieve fair parliamentary representation (Daily Star 2024). By allowing various voices in national decision-making while keeping FPTP's constituency link, this structural reform can transform Bangladesh's political dynamics.

Bangladesh needs election reform because the FPTP system increases political polarization, voter apathy, and outrageously unequal seat allocations that distort the majority will. The 1991

Citation: Md. Saidur Rahaman, Shahidur Rahman Shakib. 2025. Mixed Proportional Representation in Election System of Bangladesh. *Social Lens* 2(1), 24-37.

<https://doi.org/10.69971/sl.2.1.2025.39>



Copyright: © 2025 by the authors. Submitted for possible open access publication under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>

general election showed this dysfunction: the BNP won 140 seats (46.7% of Parliament) with 30.81% of votes, whereas the Awami League won 30.08% with 93 seats (31%). MPR ensures that no votes are wasted by giving proportional parliamentary representation to even little parties with modest national support (1% representing 1.2 million voters) (Daily Star 2024). Beyond resolving representational disparities, MPR can reduce black money in politics by shifting electoral competitiveness from patronage networks to party platforms and policy stances (Prothom Alo 2024). Comparative political analysis shows that proportional systems strengthen democratic resilience by incorporating diverse viewpoints and preventing authoritarian consolidation through institutionalized pluralism (Ali 2024). Critics like (Rizvi 2024) argue that MPR empowers "anti-liberation forces." According to (Titumir 2025), combining MPR with a bicameral legislative structure could strengthen Bangladesh's political system by decentralizing power from Dhaka-centric elites and strengthening checks and balances.

Election reform in Bangladesh shows profound differences among major political actors, reflecting fundamental disagreements regarding democratic representation. MPR has been opposed by the BNP leadership due to concerns about party fragmentation and electoral confusion (Rizvi 2024). However, many political analysts and civil society advocates argue that it would strengthen democratic institutions by ensuring all legitimate political voices receive fair parliamentary representation (Akash 2025). Incumbent parties, like the Awami League in 2008 or BNP in 2001, naturally fight changes that will weaken their legislative dominance (Somoy 2024). Infact, MPR implementation will minimize electoral violence, improve political accountability, and stabilize Bangladesh's often-turbulent democratic processes (Kamal 2024). Such thorough electoral change requires significant constitutional amendments, possibly including a bicameral legislative system for more diversified representation (Titumir 2025). Nepal's 2008 constitutional reforms teach us about democratic transition, emphasizing the need for gradual, context-sensitive implementation strategies that take Bangladesh's political culture and institutional realities into account (Titumir 2025).

MPR acceptability and understanding are major obstacles to election change in Bangladesh. Many people are unfamiliar with proportional representation mechanics, which could hinder implementation (Rizvi 2024). As shown in consecutive election cycles, popular unhappiness with FPTP's unfairness predicts increased openness to alternate systems (Bhattacharya 2025). MPR will revolutionize political campaigning by eliminating "vote bank" politics and boosting issue-based election competition (Ali 2024). The Election Commission has advocated proportional representation to boost democratic legitimacy (Jamuna TV 2024). Entrenched political resistance from strong parties, legal and constitutional challenges, and the necessity for thorough voter education are the main MPR implementation obstacles. Beginning with pilot programmes in local government elections before scaling up to national parliamentary contests will provide empirical evidence of MPR's viability in Bangladesh and allow for practical adjustments (Titumir 2025). This careful strategy would blend electoral reform urgency with systemic political transformation details.

Bangladesh's voting system reform discussion highlights democratic inclusivity vs entrenched power structures. The current FPTP system amplifies established political parties' parliamentary majorities, but the proposed MPR system will reflect the electorate's diverse political preferences. A thorough review of historical election data (BBC News 2024), comparative studies of successful implementations in other democracies (Hajjaj 2025), and expert assessments of Bangladesh's political setting (Akash 2025) support MPR adoption. While strategically comprehensible, major political parties' resistance (Rizvi 2024; Somoy 2024) underlines the necessity for continued cross-party dialogue and forceful public lobbying to overcome institutional inertia. Bangladesh's electoral system reform goes beyond technical changes to voting processes to rethink political power distribution and exercise. While difficult, MPR can address long-standing democratic weaknesses, minimize political violence, and establish a more inclusive and representative political system that can address Bangladesh's complex governance concerns in the 21st century.

2. Literature Review

This literature review synthesizes the arguments surrounding electoral reform, examining the viability of PR in Bangladesh's political context while incorporating all referenced perspectives. The electoral system in Bangladesh has long been a subject of intense debate, with growing calls for transitioning from the existing First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system to a Proportional Representation (PR) model. Proponents argue that PR would ensure fairer representation, reduce political exclusion, and mitigate the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the current winner-takes-all framework (Ahsan 2024; Islam 2024; Khan 2024). Conversely, opponents, particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), contend that PR would undermine direct accountability, destabilize governance, and serve the interests of smaller parties or foreign actors (Rizvi 2024; Fakhrul 2025; Daily Inqilab 2024).

FPTP system distorts democratic representation by allowing parties to secure parliamentary majorities with less than half of the popular vote, effectively disenfranchising large segments of the electorate (Bonik Barta 2023; Banglanews24.com 2025). Islam (2024) asserts that PR would better reflect the diversity of public opinion, ensuring that smaller parties and marginalized groups gain legislative representation. This perspective is reinforced by (Khan 2024), who highlights how PR minimizes wasted votes and fosters a more inclusive political environment, particularly in a polarized society like Bangladesh.

Several political parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami, Jatiya Party, and leftists, have endorsed PR, framing it as a necessary safeguard against one-party dominance (Mzamin 2024; Dhaka Post 2024; Nur 2025). Nurul Haque Nur of Gono Odhikar Parishad threatened mass protests to demand PR-based elections, arguing that the current system perpetuates electoral injustice (Nur 2025). Similarly, (Sarkar 2024) emphasizes that PR could enhance gender balance and minority representation, addressing structural inequalities in Bangladesh's political landscape.

PR mechanism can reduce electoral violence and manipulation. In FPTP, candidates can win seats with a minority of votes, exacerbating political tensions (Swapan 2024). In contrast, PR encourages coalition-building and consensus politics, potentially mitigating the zero-sum nature of Bangladesh's electoral contests (Shakil 2024). PR aligns with the spirit of Bangladesh's Liberation War by ensuring broader participation in governments (Quader 2017).

PR faces strong resistance, particularly from the BNP, which argues that the system would erode direct voter-representative linkages and lead to fragmented governance (BV News24 2025; Jamuna TV 2025). PR is a foreign-imposed model unsuitable for Bangladesh, which can empower "anti-liberation forces" and create instability (Rizvi 2024 2025). (Chowdhury 2024), contends that PR would centralize power within party elites, reducing MPs' accountability to constituents.

Table 1. Consolidated Literature Review Matrix on Proportional Representation in Bangladesh

Article Title	Author/ Source	Type of Analysis	Key Arguments	Methodology	Identified Gaps	Problem Statements	Relevance to Research
Questions that need answers about proportional representation	Islam, N. (2024) (Prothom Alo)	Conceptual + Theoretical + Case-based	PR is more inclusive; Bangladesh needs tailored, gradual adoption; local governance must integrate with national representation.	Normative-analytical (comparisons: Nepal, Srilanka, Germany, NZ)	No empirical data on readiness; missing PR-local governance integration; no transition roadmap.	How to structurally/culturally integrate PR? Which model suits democratic deepening?	Provides normative foundation for Mixed PR (MPR) advocacy.
What exactly is the proportional voting system?	Khan, M.I (Dhaka Tribune Bangla)	Conceptual + Theoretical + Empirical references	PR promotes fairer representation than majoritarianism; requires voter education and balanced party-candidate influence.	Normative + historical examples (Europe)	No Bangladesh-specific studies; lacks voter education strategies; insufficient hybrid model exploration.	How to adapt PR to Bangladesh's political culture? How to ensure stability amid fragmentation?	Foundation-al understanding of PR principles and challenges.
Discussion on proportional election system	Mzamin (2024)	Conceptual + Empirical	PR ensures broader representation but requires constitutional amendments and political consensus.	Political party statements, seminar discussions.	Political consensus-building; system configuration; voter education.	Feasibility of constitutional reform; coalition stability under MPR.	Timely insights for Bangladesh's electoral reform debates.
Proposal for MP election by proportional voting rate	Bangla-news24.com (2025)	Conceptual/Theoretical	Advocates PR for fairer representation, reduced irregularities, and small-party empowerment. Relaxes party-line voting.	Parliamentary speech (rhetorical).	No feasibility study; ignores constitutional-al challenges; no voter/elite preference data.	How to adapt MPR to Bangladesh's legal context? How to address Article 70 constraints?	Highlights promise/complexity of MPR adoption.
The next election must be held on a proportional basis	Nur (2025)	Conceptual/Advocacy	PR ensures all parties are fairly represented; frames it as a solution to political crisis.	Political speech.	No operational design; ignores legal obstacles; no empirical impact analysis.	How would PR change party systems? What constitutional reforms are needed?	Shows urgency but lacks detail for feasible reform.
Proportional representation-based election is the demand of the time	Sarkar (2024)	Conceptual/Theoretical	PR addresses majoritarian distortions, improves legitimacy, reduces violence, enhances women's representation. References Nepal/Sri Lanka.	Descriptive essay.	No modeling of PR outcomes; lacks thresholds/seat formulas; no legal roadmap.	How to operationalize MPR for inclusivity/stability? How to manage coalitions?	Justifies reform but needs empirical validation.

Article Title	Author/Source	Type of Analysis	Key Arguments	Methodology	Identified Gaps	Problem Statements	Relevance to Research
Debate on proportional election system	Rashid Swapan, H.U. (2024, October 19).	Conceptual + Theoretical (light empirical)	PR reflects public will, reduces violence, prevents authoritarian majorities, ensures small-party participation.	Expert/leader opinions; global data (91 countries).	No simulations for Bangladesh; missing comparative analysis.	What structural reforms are needed for MPR? How to mitigate nomination trade-offs?	Strengthens theoretical rationale for PR.
Thoughts on national elections by proportional representation: which path for BNP?	Shakil, S.T. (2024) Bangla Tribune	Conceptual + Empirical	PR ensures participation but BNP is skeptical; civic groups support it for inclusivity.	Journalistic interviews (party leaders, policymakers).	No constitutional clarity; administrative readiness; stakeholder consensus.	Can PR ensure stability without undermining democracy?	Real-time discourse on political divisions.
No one will accept any conspiracy in the name of proportional representation election	Rizvi (BNP leader)	Political Commentary	PR is a tool for weak parties; undermines direct democracy and voter choice.	Political speech (anecdotal).	No empirical data; public awareness gaps.	Risks to voter sovereignty; elite resistance.	Highlights opposition and public misconceptions.
Concerns of supporters and opponents of proportional voting	Noman, M.A. (2024) Protidiner Sangbad	Conceptual + Empirical	PR reduces authoritarianism but risks elite centralization, voter alienation, and instability. Current system underrepresents majority preferences.	Editorial (seminars, international examples).	No implementation roadmap; no public education plan.	How to make PR acceptable in polarization? How to prevent elite capture?	Critical feasibility insights for MPR.
‘Minority’ government or proportional election system?	Bonik Barta (2023)	Conceptual + Empirical	FPTP creates minority governments; PR ensures fairer representation, discourages winner-takes-all dynamics.	Electoral data analysis (1991–2023).	No exploration of hybrid systems like MMP.	FPTP fails to reflect popular vote.	Supports MPR as a solution to representation crises.
BNP does not support proportional representation election system	BNP Official Statement	Political Position	BNP opposes PR due to governance instability risks and loss of constituency accountability.	Official statements.	No empirical evidence; ignores voter inclusion.	Political resistance as a barrier.	Reveals party-level opposition to reform.
The next election must be held on a proportional basis	Nur (2025)	Advocacy	Demands PR to represent all parties; threatens movement if ignored.	Political gathering speech.	No implementation details.	Lack of consensus risks civil unrest.	Shows grassroots support for PR.
BNP, Jamaat, and other parties’ calculations on proportional elections	Babu, T. (2024) BBC News Bangla	Empirical/Political	Parties split on PR; debate over who gains/losses.	Media report.	No reform mechanism analysis.	Political uncertainty over electoral stakes.	Demonstrates partisan divisions.
Election of members of parliament by proportional	Hossain, M.I. (2024)	Analytical	FPTP ensures local accountability; PR risks instability and weakens local links. Bangladesh’s	Critical review.	No empirical PR impact data.	How to balance representation/stability?	Balanced critique of PR vs. FPTP.

Article Title	Author/Source	Type of Analysis	Key Arguments	Methodology	Identified Gaps	Problem Statements	Relevance to Research
system and the reality	Dainik Amader Shomoy		political culture suits FPTP.				
Delhi's new project to rehabilitate Awami League in politics: India's Chanakya policy 'proportional election'	Daily Inqilab (2024)	Political Commentary	Frames PR as foreign interference; nationalist parties oppose it.	Discourse/media analysis.	No electoral impact evidence.	PR seen as conspiracy threatening sovereignty.	Highlights nationalist resistance.
Is it possible to introduce proportional representation elections in Bangladesh?	Amin, N. (2024) Bonik Barta	Analytical/Contextual	PR promotes inclusivity but risks disconnecting MPs from constituencies and centralizing party control.	Literature review + comparative analysis.	No local impact data.	PR may weaken accountability and cause fragmentation.	Contextual pros/cons of PR.
Next election must be held proportionally: Jamaat Ameer	Jamaat-e-Islami Leader	Political Statement	PR ensures equitable representation and prevents monopoly.	Speech/event reporting.	No implementation details.	Past elections lacked fairness; voter disenfranchisement.	Islamist party's advocacy for PR.
BNP does not support the proportional representation election system	BNP Official Statement	Political Statement	PR lacks public familiarity; destabilizing.	Political briefing.	No alternative reform exploration.	Fear of instability due to system change.	Opposition perspective on PR.
Do people understand the concept of proportional elections?	Rizvi (BNP leader)	Political Critique	Public unaware; PR empowers parties over voters.	Political gathering speech.	No empirical opinion data.	Risk of voter alienation under PR.	Opposition concerns about voter agency.
Proportional elections mean supporting anti-liberation forces	Rizvi (BNP leader)	Political Critique	Society unprepared; PR creates instability (cites Nepal).	Political event speech.	No public consultation.	PR may empower anti-liberation groups.	Opposition warns of political risks.
There is no question of proportional elections	Mirza Fakhrul (BNP)	Political Statement	BNP opposes PR; prefers local elections first.	Interview/briefing.	No PR system analysis.	Concerns about fragmentation.	Major party's resistance to PR.
Proportional election system would be better	Dr. Shahdin Malik (2022, Samakal)	Expert Opinion	Hybrid system (direct + PR seats) proposed; reduces violence, ensures inclusivity. Constitutional amendments needed.	Expert interview.	Political consensus lacking.	Broken electoral system; resistance to reform.	Legal expert's case for MPR.
Why do small parties want elections by	The Business Standard (2024)	Advocacy Reporting	Small parties benefit from PR; experts doubt feasibility.	Expert commentary.	No political feasibility analysis.	Tension between reform	Small parties' motivations

Article Title	Author/Source	Type of Analysis	Key Arguments	Methodology	Identified Gaps	Problem Statements	Relevance to Research
proportional representation?						demands and reality.	vs. skepticism.
Effective way to prevent autocracy is proportional election	Dhaka Mail (2024)	Expert Opinion	PR limits autocracy but requires party/cultural reforms. Low public awareness.	Webinar reporting.	No transitional strategies.	Electoral reform alone insufficient.	Links PR to broader democratic reforms.
Discussion on proportional election system	Mzamin (2024)	Political Debate	PR favored by many parties (Jatiya, Jamaat) but opposed by BNP. Requires constitutional changes.	Seminar reports.	No consensus-building strategies.	Coalition instability risks.	Party stances and procedural challenges.
Disagreement over the election method of women's reserved seats	Islam, S. (2025, Kalbela)	Policy Debate	PR could enhance women's representation but parties disagree on nomination vs. Direct election.	Leader/expert statements.	No consensus on implementation.	Token representation risks; constitutional hurdles.	Gender quota reform complexities.
In whose interest is proportional representation ?	Chowdhury, R.R. (2024, Bangladesh Pratidin)	Political Critique	PR risks destabilization, weakens local accountability, marginalizes independents.	Opinion/analysis.	No empirical voter engagement data.	Decline in turnout; factional disputes.	Case for improving FPTP over PR.
Proportional representation election voting method and the Bangladesh context	Quader, G.M. (2017)	Theoretical	PR reduces vote wastage, ensures inclusivity; compares models (party list, MMp, sSTV).	Comparative analysis.	No third-force emergence under current system.	Systemic exclusion of minorities.	Advocates PR for democratic pluralism.
People have no idea about proportional representation election	Rizvi (BNP leader)	Political Commentary	Public unaware; PR lacks mass acceptance.	Political event coverage.	No opinion surveys.	Public unfamiliarity as reform barrier.	Elite-driven resistance to PR.
Proposal for proportional seats in elections has been considered by the CEC	News Bangla 24 (2022)	Institutional Commentary	CEC supports PR but stresses political consensus.	Dialogue proceedings.	No operational details.	EC lacks authority to enforce reform.	Institutional limitations on reform.
Jamaat wants proportional representation in parliament	Jaijaidin (2025)	Political Positioning	Demands PR, expatriate voting, and local elections under caretaker government.	Post-meeting statements.	No legal mechanism details.	Unclear constitutional alignment.	Party-specific reform advocacy.
Proportional election demand submitted to the government	Jamaat-e-Islami	Political Declaration	Jamaat proposes PR for all 300 seats; links to fair representation.	Rally speech.	No transitional roadmap.	Lack of political/legal consensus.	PR as democratic restoration tool.

Article Title	Author/Source	Type of Analysis	Key Arguments	Methodology	Identified Gaps	Problem Statements	Relevance to Research
Proportional electoral system in discussion	Priyo.com (2024)	Opinion-Based Coverage	PR gaining traction in political discourse.	Media reporting.	No policy specifics.	Unclear integration with current systems.	Reflects shifting reform narratives.

The BNP's opposition is also strategic; (Shakil 2024) suggests that the party fears marginalization under PR, given its reliance on FPTP's majoritarian outcomes. Public lacks understanding of PR, making its implementation politically risky (Rizvi 2024). PR can destabilize coalition governments, as seen in Nepal, and disrupt Bangladesh's governance efficiency (Hossain 2024).

Allegations of foreign influence further complicate the debate. (The Daily Inqilab 2024) frames PR as an Indian-backed scheme to reinstate the Awami League, while (Rizvi 2025) labels it a conspiracy by smaller parties to gain undue power. Conversely, (Dhaka Mail 2024 and Mzamin 2024) counter that PR is a globally recognized democratic tool, not a foreign imposition.

Implementing PR requires constitutional amendments and broad political consensus, both of which remain contentious (Karim 2024; Amin 2024). The Election Commission has expressed theoretical support for PR but maintains that reforms must be driven by political parties (News Bangla 2022). (Quader 2017) proposes a Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system as a compromise, combining FPTP's local representation with PR's proportionality. However, (Malik 2022) warns that without genuine political will, even hybrid models may fail. The debate extends to women's reserved seats, with some parties advocating for direct elections under PR, while others prefer nomination-based selection (Islam 2025). Small parties like Jamaat-e-Islami continue to push for PR, alongside demands for expatriate voting and neutral interim governments (Rahman 2024; Muha 2024).

Bangladesh's electoral reform debate reflects deeper tensions between inclusivity and stability. While PR is a path toward fairer representation, its success hinges on overcoming political resistance, ensuring public awareness, and designing a context-specific model. Without consensus, electoral reforms risk exacerbating, rather than resolving, the country's democratic deficits. The discourse remains polarized, with PR symbolizing either a democratic necessity or a destabilizing risk, depending on political allegiance (Priyo.com 2024; The Business Standard 2024).

3. South Asian Electoral Systems

India

India has a bicameral parliament consisting of the Lok Sabha (Lower House) and the Rajya Sabha (Upper House). The Lok Sabha comprises 545 seats, of which 543 are directly elected from single-member constituencies using the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system. The Rajya Sabha can have up to 250 members, 238 of whom are indirectly elected by state legislatures (Election Commission of India 2020).

The 2014 and 2019 Lok Sabha elections have highlighted the major limitations of the FPTP system in a country with a vast and diverse voter base. The system has often led to disproportional representation, where parties with a minority of the popular vote achieve a majority of seats. This has led to increasing calls from political parties and civil society to reform the FPTP model. Proportional Representation (PR) is a potentially more effective alternative for ensuring inclusive representation and political fairness (Misra 2018). Some reform advocates also argue for a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system to balance constituency-based representation with proportional allocation.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan has a bicameral National Assembly, composed of the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) and the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People). The Wolesi Jirga comprises 249 members elected through the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system. This method does not allow political parties to consolidate their positions effectively and often results in fragmented parliamentary representation. A proportional representation system, particularly a closed-list variant, may better promote party development, enhance legislative stability, and foster ethnic balance in a highly diverse society (Ghadiri 2010). SNTV favors independent candidates over structured party systems, undermining long-term political institutionalization.

Nepal

Nepal's unicameral Constituent Assembly consists of 601 members. Of these, 240 are directly elected, 335 are chosen from party lists under a proportional representation (PR) system, and 26 are nominated by the interim government. The PR list mandates that at least 50% of the candidates be women including quotas for indigenous groups, Madhesis, Dalits, backward regions, and other marginalized communities (Election Commission of Nepal 2020). This mixed electoral system was adopted after a decade-long conflict and ensures inclusive governance in post-conflict societies. The inclusion of proportional elements has significantly improved minority representation and gender balance in national politics.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka's parliament has 225 members, with 196 elected from 22 multi-member districts and 29 selected from a national list. The country follows an open-list PR system, allowing voters to select up to three preferred candidates. If no candidate secures a majority, second-preference votes are redistributed, making it a two-step voting process (Election Commission of Sri Lanka 2019). This system enhances voter influence over individual candidate selection while preserving party proportionality. However, the open-list format has also been criticized for fostering intense intra-party competition, leading to increased campaign expenditures and political patronage. Nonetheless, Sri Lanka's experience illustrates the complexities and trade-offs involved in designing and implementing a functional PR-based electoral system.

4. Methods

A systematic literature review (SLR) guided by the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) framework was used to analyze available literature, media content, and policy discourse on the electoral reform debate in Bangladesh, focusing on the proposal for a Mixed Proportional Representation (MPR) system. This methodology ensures transparency, reproducibility, and a structured approach in synthesizing insights from a diverse pool of sources. Both academic and non-academic sources including peer-reviewed articles, opinion editorials, national and international news media reports, television interviews, talk shows, policy briefs, and publications from institutional and policy research organizations were screened. The data was collected between June 2000 and June 28, 2025, utilizing multiple platforms such as YouTube, public Facebook pages (notably from broadcasters like NTV and Somoy News), and the official websites of major news portals including Prothom Alo, BBC Bangla, The Daily Star, and Dhaka Tribune. Statements from political parties and insights from think tanks were included to ensure a holistic understanding of the evolving discourse on electoral reform in Bangladesh. The search terms included “Proportional representation in Bangladesh,” “Mixed electoral system,” “Election reform,” “Bicameral parliament Bangladesh,” “FPTP vs PR,” and “Public opinion on PR elections.” The search was limited to publicly accessible content to ensure the transparency, verifiability, and reproducibility of the findings.

To maintain the relevance and quality of the review, specific inclusion criteria were applied. Only content published between January 2022 and June 2025 was considered. The selected materials had to directly address electoral reform within the context of Bangladesh, offering expert analysis, informed policy discourse, or empirical observations. Sources were required to be written in either English or Bengali, provided that the Bengali sources had official or widely accepted translations available. Repetitive reports or derivative summaries lacking original content, politically charged commentary that did not specifically focus on the electoral system, and personal blogs or anonymous sources that could not be independently verified were excluded.

Table 2. Screening and Selection Process Based on PRISMA Framework

Stage	Description	Number of Records
Identification	Records identified through online databases and manual searches	83
Screening	Duplicates removed	8
	Records after duplicates removed and screened based on title and abstract	75
	Full-text articles and videos assessed for eligibility	56
Eligibility	Records excluded due to poor reliability or lack of relevance	6
Included	Final sources included in the qualitative synthesis (media reports, editorials, expert analysis, etc.)	50

5. Data Extraction

Each selected item was carefully reviewed to extract important information. This included identifying the type of source, such as whether it was a news report, academic article, or video. The content was also examined to determine the stance it took on the proportional representation system—whether it was supportive, critical, or neutral. Due attention was paid to whether the material discussed bicameralism or proposed a mixed electoral system, and which stakeholders were involved, such as political parties, academic experts, or the Election Commission. Information on how different countries approach proportional representation was also noted to provide international context.

6. Plan for analyses and proposal

The collected data were then analyzed through a manual qualitative process. Thematic coding helped identify key patterns, which were organized into several major categories. These included public perception of the electoral system, the institutional feasibility of implementing reforms, comparisons with electoral models from other countries, and various political responses to the idea of proportional representation. While the PRISMA framework ensured methodological rigor, this review faced certain limitations. There was a lack of peer-reviewed journal articles specifically addressing recent debates on proportional representation in Bangladesh, which required greater reliance on media sources. Some regional video interviews posed language interpretation challenges, and the rapidly evolving political landscape means that stakeholder positions may have shifted since the review period. Nevertheless, this systematic literature review offers a comprehensive and timely overview of the ongoing discourse on electoral reform in the country.

7. Analyses and Findings

Comparative analysis of electoral systems across South Asia reveals a diverse spectrum of approaches, each influenced by its respective country’s political history, ethnic composition, and democratic aspirations. India’s long-standing FPTP system, Nepal’s mixed model and Sri Lanka’s open-list PR structure are important case studies from which Bangladesh can derive valuable insights as it debates the possibility of electoral reform. The limitations and successes seen in these neighboring countries strengthen the argument that Bangladesh must critically reassess the effectiveness of its current FPTP system and explore the advantages of adopting a Mixed Proportional Representation (MPR) model. India’s electoral system, though historically resilient, has shown significant cracks in recent years. The FPTP method in the Lok Sabha elections has disproportionate outcomes—where parties with less than 40% of the popular vote have achieved absolute majorities in parliament (Misra 2018). This raises concerns about democratic fairness, especially in a pluralistic society. For Bangladesh, which shares similar ethnic, religious, and linguistic

diversity, the Indian example is a cautionary tale. The FPTP system may provide stability, but it does so at the cost of representative justice. It also risks undermining public trust if large segments of the electorate feel perpetually excluded from legislative power.

Afghanistan's experience with the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system is a different kind of electoral challenge-fragmentation. Although SNTV has facilitated individual participation, it has weakened political parties, leading to legislative incoherence and difficulty in policy formulation (Ghadiri 2010). Bangladesh, with intense political polarization and party-centric governance, would not benefit from a system that diminishes party structures. However, the Afghan case underlines the importance of electoral systems that encourage institutionalized party politics and ethnic inclusivity-two critical components for democratic deepening in Bangladesh. Nepal is the most instructive model for Bangladesh. Emerging from a violent civil conflict, Nepal's mixed electoral system is consciously designed to repair divisions and ensure equitable representation. The combination of direct elections and proportional representation has allowed for greater inclusion of women, marginalized communities, and ethnic minorities (Election Commission of Nepal 2020). For Bangladesh-where indigenous communities, religious minorities, and women are underrepresented in formal politics-Nepal's model has the transformative potential of inclusive electoral design. The quota-driven structure in the PR component reflects how electoral systems can be tailored to promote social justice and unity in post-conflict or transitional societies.

Sri Lanka's open-list PR system gives voters considerable power over candidate selection, which enhances democratic participation. However, the system has led to unintended consequences, such as aggressive intra-party rivalries and inflated campaign spending (Election Commission of Sri Lanka 2019). Bangladesh must consider these trade-offs carefully. While increasing voter agency is desirable, it must be balanced against the need to control the cost of elections and reduce the influence of money and muscle power in politics. Taken together, these regional experiences underscore that no electoral system is perfect. Each has strengths and vulnerabilities, often shaped by context-specific realities. For Bangladesh, the key takeaway is the necessity of systemic reforms that prioritize inclusive representation, electoral fairness, and governability. The FPTP system, despite its simplicity and historical use, is insufficient in a society marked by political polarization, minority marginalization, and growing demands for accountability.

The MPR system is a balanced solution, combining the constituency link of FPTP with the inclusiveness of PR. It allows citizens to elect local representatives while ensuring that the overall composition of the legislature more accurately reflects the national vote. It will help mitigate vote wastage, reduce the dominance of any single party, and offer smaller parties and marginalized groups a meaningful voice in the law-making process. In the broader South Asian context, Bangladesh is at a crucial crossroads. Neighboring nations are experimenting, evolving, and, in some cases, correcting historical electoral injustices through pragmatic reforms. As calls for a more inclusive and representative democracy grow louder within the country, it is vital that Bangladesh draws from these regional lessons-not to replicate systems blindly, but to craft an electoral model that responds to its unique political, social, and cultural realities. Bangladesh should transition towards a Mixed Proportional Representation system-not just as a technical reform, but as a democratic imperative to ensure long-term stability, political pluralism, and public trust in the electoral process. Here are the common factors needs to consider in case adopting MPR in Bangladesh.

Public Perception and Awareness

A recurring theme throughout the reviewed materials is the general lack of public understanding of the proportional representation (PR) system. While some civil society groups and youth activists, especially student leaders like Nurul Haque Nur, have voiced strong support for mixed or PR-based systems, ordinary citizens are unfamiliar with mechanics of this systems. Media coverage often highlights confusion or skepticism among the electorate, particularly regarding terms like "mixed system" or "bicameral parliament." This indicates a critical need for civic education on electoral alternatives.

Institutional Feasibility and Political Will

The literature reveals mixed opinions on the institutional readiness of Bangladesh to adopt a mixed proportional representation model. The Election Commission lacks both legal authority and logistical capacity to implement such a major electoral shift without significant structural reforms. Smaller parties and opposition coalitions support PR as a means to ensure fairer representation, ruling party officials and major party leaders have shown resistance or reluctance. The feasibility of establishing a bicameral legislature is also questioned in terms of constitutional reform and political consensus.

Comparative Models and International Experience

Many sources provide comparative insights from countries such as Germany, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, where versions of the proportional or mixed systems are in place. These examples argue that PR fosters inclusivity, reduces the dominance of single-party rule, and provides space for minority voices. However, a few sources also caution against assuming that models from different political cultures can be directly transplanted into Bangladesh's unique political context without adaptation.

Political Responses and Partisan Divide

The thematic analysis shows a clear divide among political stakeholders. Jamaat-e-Islami and left-leaning alliances support PR, believing it would give them a more equitable share of seats. BNP has shown ambivalence, with some factions advocating for reform while others fear the system may be manipulated. Awami League and its allies are generally opposed or non-committal, citing concerns over governance complexity and political stability. This divide reflects deeper concerns about control over electoral outcomes and institutional trust.

Media Framing and Elite Discourse

Mainstream media and prominent columnists play a crucial role in shaping elite discourse on electoral reform. Editorials in outlets like Prothom Alo, The Daily Star, and Bonik Barta often frame the debate around democracy restoration, political polarization, and the need for a more inclusive electoral mechanism. However, some right-leaning outlets and political commentators frame PR as a potential threat to national unity or a tool for anti-liberation forces, reflecting ideological biases in coverage.

Role of Youth and Civil Society

The growing involvement of youth movements, student groups, and urban intellectuals in calling for electoral reform is another significant theme. Their support for mixed or proportional models is linked to broader demands for political accountability, decentralization, and systemic transparency. Social media platforms are increasingly being used to mobilize public opinion around these ideas, signaling a possible generational shift in political engagement.

8. A Proposing Model to Apply Mixed Proportional Representation

In Bangladesh's current parliamentary electoral system of FPTP results to dominance of a particular party in most constituencies, and often capable representatives fail to get elected solely due to party affiliations. To overcome this limitation, we are proposing a Divisional Mixed Electoral System.

9. Proposed Structure

The existing 300 seats will remain unchanged and elections will be held using the FPTP method including in lower house. Additionally, 30% more seats will be added to each division based on their number of constituencies, and elections for those seats will be conducted through the PR method and they are including in upper house. If the decimal is greater than 0.5 in any division, it will be rounded up to the next whole number. As a result, the total number of seats will be 390 (300 FPTP + 90 PR), making the parliament more representative and balanced. Every administrative division in Bangladesh will be segmented into four operational zones: education & health, environment & culture, labor & employment, and sports & expatriate welfare. Representatives for these zones will be elected by the Proportional Representation (PR) method, with political parties nominating individuals possessing pertinent knowledge in these specialized domains. This strategy aims to guarantee that every zone within a division is managed by a proficient and specialized expert, thus fostering a more efficient, inclusive, and skill-oriented approach to governance and policy formulation. Below is an example:

Table-3. Proposed MPR framework

Division	Existing Seats	30% (PR) Seats (Approx.)	Increased PR Seats
Dhaka	70	21	21 persons
Chattogram	58	17.4	17 persons
Rajshahi	39	11.7	12 persons
Khulna	36	10.8	11 persons
Barisal	20	6	6 persons
Rangpur	33	9.9	10 persons
Mymensingh	22	6.6	7 persons
Sylhet	19	5.7	6 persons
Total	300	90	90 persons

10. The Dual Representation Framework for Electoral Reform in Bangladesh

Mixed Proportional Representation (MPR) system establishes a dual representation framework in which Members of Parliament are elected via both the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR) procedures. Representatives elected via the FPTP system will concentrate on advocating for their local districts and spearheading region-specific development initiatives. Conversely, representatives chosen under the PR system will assume a more specialized function in strategizing, policy formulation, and supervising development in distinct domains such as education, health, environment, labor, and culture. Although both groups of members will possess equivalent parliamentary standing, their duties will vary according to territory and thematic emphasis, thereby guaranteeing a balanced government approach.

An Annual Evaluation Survey will be implemented for all PR-elected members to guarantee accountability and uphold performance standards. Any member who does not exhibit qualitative improvement in their designated zone or fails to achieve performance standards would be disqualified from their position and prohibited from participating in future elections under both FPTP and PR systems. A rigorous anti-corruption framework will be instituted. Should a PR-elected member be implicated in corrupt actions, formal grievances may be lodged by interested parties, citizens, or other MPs. Following the confirmation of the claims, the party's seat will be rescinded and allocated to a competent candidate from an alternative majority party. This procedure will serve as a deterrent to corruption and bolster public trust in the voting system.

The adoption of this hybrid electoral system can yield numerous beneficial results. This will facilitate inclusive involvement from all political parties, guaranteeing that even small parties have representation under the PR paradigm. Divisional governance will be enhanced by the proficiency of specialists designated to particular subject domains, resulting in more effective and specialized policymaking. The technology will help realize a really participatory democracy, converting the notion of a "people's government" into a practical reality. The concentration of power will decrease as each party gains representation in parliament. A central coordinating ministry will oversee the eight functional zones within each division, facilitating cohesive and inclusive national

growth. This proposed election reform represents a significant transition towards competence-based, transparent, and inclusive democratic administration in Bangladesh, rather than only a procedural modification.

11. Discussion

Declining democratic competition, allegations of electoral malpractice, and the need to improve political inclusiveness have highlighted need of electoral system reforms in Bangladesh. In this regard, the proposal of a Mixed Proportional Representation (MPR) system has gained prominence as a way to balance local accountability with fairer, more proportional outcomes. Implementing such a major electoral change is neither straightforward nor universally accepted. To assess its prospects, it is essential to understand the diverse factors shaping the feasibility, desirability, and political dynamics of reform in Bangladesh. This section presents a detailed analysis of key themes that emerged from a review of existing research, stakeholder perspectives, and comparative experience.

The analysis highlights six interrelated dimensions critical to evaluating MPR's potential in Bangladesh: public perception, institutional feasibility, comparative models, political responses, media framing, and civil society and youth engagement. Each theme reveals opportunities as well as significant challenges, from widespread voter confusion and limited institutional readiness to elite resistance and partisan polarization. At the same time, comparative lessons and growing civil society activism indicate pathways for meaningful change if carefully tailored to local realities. Taken together, these findings provide a nuanced, evidence-based foundation for understanding both the promise and the obstacles of introducing Mixed Proportional Representation in Bangladesh's electoral system. They aim to inform policy discussions, public debate, and future reform strategies grounded in local context and international best practices.

Public perception in Bangladesh regarding electoral system reform, particularly the concept of a Mixed Proportional Representation (MPR) model, is limited and marked by confusion. Voters often conflate proportional representation systems with the current First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system. This confusion is exacerbated by insufficient civic education and minimal public discussion on alternative electoral systems. Despite the general low awareness, there exists a latent demand among the population for fairer and more representative elections, especially in the context of recent contested polls and allegations of vote rigging. However, without sustained and targeted educational campaigns, accessible non-partisan information, and active media engagement, public can't understand MPR proposals. Building broad-based support thus requires concerted efforts through civic education initiatives, media involvement, and grassroots consultations to demystify the reform and communicate how it could reduce electoral distortions and enhance political legitimacy.

Implementation of this MPR system in Bangladesh poses significant challenges and would necessitate constitutional or parliamentary amendments to replace the current single-member district framework, a process fraught with political contention and risks of partisan deadlock. Logistically, the shift to MPR requires substantial infrastructure development, including redrawing constituency boundaries to balance district seats with party list allocations, redesigning ballots, conducting robust voter education, and intensifying training for election officials. The Election Commission needs to expand its capacity, gain greater independence, and secure enhanced resources to manage the complexities of this transition. Furthermore, there is limited evidence of sustained political will within key state institutions to prioritize such electoral reform. Bureaucratic inertia, competing policy priorities, and fears of political destabilization further reduce institutional readiness. Consequently, any move toward MPR demands a carefully phased implementation strategy that encompasses legal reforms, capacity-building, and extensive piloting before national adoption.

Comparative models from other countries provide valuable insights but must be adapted cautiously to Bangladesh's unique political landscape. Germany's mixed-member proportional system, effectively balances local representation with overall proportionality, enabling smaller parties to gain fair representation while preserving constituency ties. Similarly, Nepal's recent adoption of MPR in a post-conflict setting aimed to include marginalized groups and foster political stability. Sri Lanka's hybrid system offers lessons in managing party competition and voter complexity. However, Bangladesh's political culture is characterized by deep polarization, histories of election boycotts, violence, and mutual distrust among major parties, making wholesale transplantation of these models impractical. Electoral design must therefore carefully consider risks such as elite capture of party lists, manipulation of district boundaries, and voter confusion. Thoughtful adaptation that accounts for local administrative, cultural, and political realities is essential for any successful reform.

Political responses to the idea of electoral reform in Bangladesh are deeply divided and largely driven by strategic calculations. Incumbent parties often resist MPR reforms if they believe the existing FPTP system benefits them, while opposition parties may promote such reforms as a means of achieving fairer representation. This strategic polarization makes it difficult to build the cross-party consensus necessary for major electoral reforms. Debates around MPR are frequently marked by suspicion, accusations of opportunism, and shifting commitments that correspond to parties' changing electoral prospects. The absence of genuine dialogue and trust among political actors remains a significant obstacle. A successful reform effort would need to navigate these divisions through inclusive, mediated dialogues, confidence-building measures, and transparent, independent commissions capable of recommending politically acceptable solutions.

Media framing of electoral reform discussions in Bangladesh tends to be uneven, ideologically biased, and dominated by elite interests. Mainstream media outlets often present the issue through partisan perspectives, amplifying the voices of major political parties while marginalizing independent expert analysis and grassroots perspectives. Discussions of reform proposals like MPR are frequently abstract or polemical, lacking clear explanatory reporting on how these systems function, the trade-offs involved, or their potential adaptation to the Bangladeshi context. This results in public debate that is shallow, polarized, and vulnerable to misinformation. Elite-driven narratives can suppress meaningful citizen engagement and exacerbate public confusion. Overcoming these challenges requires encouraging more balanced, analytical, and accessible media coverage, alongside supporting journalists to develop technical literacy on electoral design.

Despite resistance from political elites and biased media coverage, civil society organizations and youth movements have emerged as significant advocates for electoral reform in Bangladesh. Student leaders and reform-minded groups have been vocal in

calling for a more inclusive and representative electoral system that addresses concerns about democratic backsliding and uncompetitive elections. These actors have successfully brought the MPR discussion onto the reform agenda by mobilizing debates on university campuses, social media platforms, and civil society forums. Their activism reflects widespread frustration with a political system viewed as closed, patronage-driven, and unresponsive to citizens' needs. Civil society also brings vital capacities to the reform process, including research, advocacy, voter education, and coalition building. Nevertheless, to sustain momentum and build broad-based support, these efforts must expand beyond urban centers and engage rural and marginalized communities. Strengthening these networks will be crucial in maintaining pressure for meaningful electoral reform and encouraging political actors to seriously consider change.

The FPTP system, currently practiced in Bangladesh, has been widely criticized for perpetuating single-party domination even when a majority of voters do not support that party. Critics argue that it marginalizes smaller political groups, exacerbates political polarization, and fails to reflect the true diversity of public opinion (Islam 2022). Such distortions in representation have triggered mass calls for a proportional framework that allows for more equitable seat distribution in the Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament).

Prominent political commentators and parties in Bangladesh have increasingly expressed concern over the country's democratic backsliding. Golam Parwar, Secretary General of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, recently warned that the absence of fair electoral systems could lead to a national disaster (Share Business 24 2025). Similarly, a report in Samakal highlighted that proportional representation is now widely considered one of the most effective mechanisms to prevent the emergence of authoritarian regimes in fragile democracies (Samakal 2024). Most political parties, excluding the major ruling and opposition blocs, have indicated their preference for a proportional model that ensures votes translate more directly into seats (The Daily Star 2024). The formation of alliances advocating for such reforms signals a shift in political consciousness and a collective desire to move beyond the limitations of the FPTP system. Further legitimizing these domestic demands is the global trend toward adopting PR systems. Globally, over 87 countries, including 40 of 43 European nations, utilize some form of PR to elect national legislatures (Palese 2018). Even countries with historically majoritarian systems, like New Zealand and the United Kingdom, have adopted mixed or full PR systems in various legislative contexts, citing improved democratic outcomes (Islam 2016).

While South Asian countries like India, Sri Lanka, and Nepal have experimented with mixed or proportional systems, the region largely remains dominated by FPTP systems, which have been criticized for their failure to promote substantive democracy (Himal Southasian 2014). Bangladesh is not an exception. Moving towards mixed models could help curb electoral violence, reduce vote rigging, and allow underrepresented voices—such as women, ethnic minorities, and smaller parties—to enter parliament (Mahabubs 2024; Ghadiri 2010). This proposition is not just theoretical. Bangladesh has already witnessed parliamentary dialogue on bicameralism and proportional representation, and several parties support a bicameral legislature as a pathway to better regional and proportional representation (Dhaka Post 2025). Moreover, media coverage from Jamuna TV shows that even traditionally oppositional parties have begun debating technicalities of proportional seat allocation, though not without dissent—BNP, for instance, has raised objections concerning implementation logistics (Jamuna TV 2024).

Supporters of proportional systems further emphasize their potential to decrease electoral corruption and prevent vote wastage. In the FPTP model, votes cast for losing candidates are effectively discarded. In contrast, PR allows nearly every vote to contribute toward parliamentary representation. Mechanisms like “overhang seats”, used in Germany, have been suggested as tools to maintain proportionality even in cases where direct candidates win more seats than their party's overall vote share warrants (Die Bundeswahlleiterin n.d.). This highlights that under the existing system, a political party can secure a majority of parliamentary seats without receiving a majority of the total votes, which undermines the democratic will of the electorate. Examples from Germany and the Netherlands emphasize that a PR system can strengthen democratic legitimacy, enhance minority inclusion, and foster political pluralism. A mixed electoral system that combines both FPTP and PR can effectively balance constituency-level representation with national proportionality (Gulam. A n.d.).

Transitioning to a Mixed Proportional Representation model will not be without challenges. According to (BD Brief 2024), potential obstacles include the complexity of dual-ballot systems, the need for administrative reform, and the possibility of increased coalition governments, which may reduce decisiveness in governance. Nonetheless, these are widely regarded as acceptable trade-offs when balanced against the democratic benefits of fair representation and voter inclusivity.

12. Recommendations

To strengthen popular representation, ensure the addition of professed individualities in policy, and reduce the monopoly of dominant political parties in Bangladesh's administrative structure, it's recommended to apply the proposed Divisional Mixed Electoral System. This system will retain the current FPTP frame while introducing a reciprocal PR medium, adding the total administrative seats from 300 to 390. Parliament will consist of both constituency-based representatives (FPTP) and division-based experts (PR), allowing original development and public policy to progress simultaneously. Each division will be grouped into four functional zones - education & health, environment & culture, labor & employment, and sports & expatriate welfare. A public nonsupervisory body should be formed to define eligibility criteria for PR appointees. Each PR-tagged member will undergo a periodic performance evaluation based on measurable KPIs (e.g., development indicators, public satisfaction checks, translucency scores). A robust complaint redressal medium should be devised to probe any allegations of corruption among PR members. Proven cases should lead to seat cancellation, and the vacancy should be filled by a meritorious seeker from a different party to maintain balance and integrity. The Bangladesh Election Commission should be equipped with advanced tools and authority to fairly conduct both FPTP and PR choices, manage performance monitoring, and insure translucency in nominations and voting. Stakeholders should be consulted to educate choosers and political parties about the new system's structure, benefits, and prospects.

13. Limitations of study and Future directions

A number of significant obstacles stand in the way of the Mixed Proportional Representation (MPR) system's quick implementation, despite the fact that it presents a promising reform for more inclusive and balanced government in Bangladesh.

Lack of public awareness, institutional ineptitude, political opposition from ruling parties, legal and constitutional obstacles, possible tokenism in nominations, logistical challenges, enduring disparities, and the possibility of biased assessments are a few of these. A number of strategic measures have been suggested to address these issues, including the introduction of civic education campaigns, a gradual departure from the FPTP system, the elimination of women's reserved seats, the establishment of monitoring organisations, the revision of legal frameworks, the improvement of electoral infrastructure, the guarantee of inclusivity, and cooperation with foreign specialists. To create a long-lasting and successful MPR system in Bangladesh, these actions are necessary.

14. Conclusions

Bangladesh's current First- history- the- Post (FPTP) electoral system, while historically rooted, leads to disproportionate representation restricting the administrative addition of professed individualities from different political and professional backgrounds. To address these structural imbalances, the proposed Divisional Mixed Electoral System, which integrates Commensurable MPR with FPTP system, offers a timely and transformative result. This mixed model has the popular familiarity of FPTP for 300 seats while introducing a fresh 90 seats (30%) distributed across divisions through PR. These PR seats, uniquely distributed into four functional zones - education & health, environment & culture, labor & employment, and sports & expatriate welfare - will allow parties to nominate competent, subject- matter experts. This encourages inclusivity and aligns administrative functions with sectoral moxie, fostering substantiation- grounded policymaking. Also, the system introduces rigorous responsibility measures, similar as periodic performance evaluations and anti-corruption enforcement, icing that tagged PR members remain effective and immorally predicated. Lower parties, frequently marginalized under FPTP, will gain a voice in this model, promoting participatory republic and reducing the monopolistic dominance of larger parties. This reform is more than a procedural adaptation; it is a strategic design to realign Bangladesh's republic with the principles of equity, specialization, and transparency. It can review the nature of political representation in the country, making the congress not only more representative of the people but also more able of meeting the experimental bourns of the nation, if enforced courteously.

References

- Ahsan, Manjurul. 2024. What is the Proportional Election System? Is This Method Possible in Bangladesh? *BBC News Bangla*. <https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/c78d090ezdpo>.
- Ajom, Gulam. 2025. Proportional Representation of Political Parties in the National Parliament.
- Akash, Emran Mahmud. 2025. PR Method Will Be Helpful for Consensus and Democratic Restoration. *The Business Standard*. https://youtu.be/VzWYfBmZFQU?si=ETyDp_P5KrbRQBTt.
- Ali, Imran. 2024. What is Proportional Representation? Why is it Popular for Preventing Autocracy? *ATN News*. <https://youtu.be/oTgtCiVsF6s?si=Kmq7eq8slxs7vUAV>.
- Amin, Nessar. 2024. Is It Possible to Introduce Proportional Representation Elections in Bangladesh? *Bonik Barta*. <https://bonikbarta.com/editorial/YHTp1X6jYmDqNkSc>.
- Aziz, Emran Mahmud. 2024. Evaluation of Proportional Representation System. *Senior Press*. <https://youtu.be/fAK2fl1x-YQ?si=Ok6MH-y9CKzRo3kT>.
- Babu, Tafsir. 2024. All the Calculations of BNP, Jamaat, and Other Parties Regarding Proportional Representation Elections. *BBC News Bangla*. <https://www.bbc.com/bengali/articles/c1e7p5w7lp2o>.
- Banglanews24.com. 2025. Proposal for MP Election by Proportional Voting Rate. <https://www.banglanews24.com/national/news/bd/771978>.
- BBC News. 2024. Political Parties' Positions on the Proportional Representation System. https://youtu.be/TsHWL485ub0?si=SuLD_P7wseAV6Vd0.
- BD Brief. 2024. Proportional Electoral System: Its Advantages, Disadvantages, and How It Can Be Implemented. https://www.bdbrief.com/blog-post_19.
- Bhattacharya, Pinaki. 2025. Which Path Will Future Politics Take? <https://youtu.be/yaKqOlPHfMU?si=FITuv52UZKU6x0-8>.
- Bonik Barta. 2023. Government of the 'numbers' or Proportional Electoral System? <https://www.bonikbarta.com/editorial/dgRP2bQNIDTpgyPH>.
- BV News24. 2025. BNP Does Not Support Proportional Representation Election System. <https://www.bvnews24.com/politics/news/171730>.
- Daily Inqilab. 2024. Delhi's New Project to Rehabilitate Awami League in Politics: India's Chanakya Policy 'Proportional Election'. <https://dailyinqilab.com/national/news/694280>.
- Dhaka Post. 2024. Next Election should be Held Proportionally: Jamaat Ameer. <https://www.dhakapost.com/country/332190>.
- Dhaka Post. 2025. Political Parties Agree on Bicameral Parliament. <https://www.dhakapost.com/national/373667>.
- Election Commission of Nepal. 2020. Electoral System in Nepal. <https://election.gov.np>.
- Election Commission of Sri Lanka. 2019. Parliamentary Electoral System Overview. <https://elections.gov.lk>.
- Ghadiri, Sara Tawab. 2010. SNTV in Afghanistan: Is There a Better Option? *Res Publica at Illinois Wesleyan University*. <https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1157&context=respublica>.
- Hajjaj, Bobby. 2025. Many Countries Hold Elections on a Proportional Basis. *Jamuna TV*. https://youtu.be/k3H6tVGM_aY?si=z9JdCUmeWIPFetOa.
- Hossain, Md. Elias. 2024. Election of Members of Parliament by Proportional System and the Reality. *Dainik Amader Shomoy*. <https://www.dainikamadershomoy.com/details/0193b6eb753e2>.
- Islam, Khademul. 2022. Proportional Representation Election and the Reality of Bangladesh. *Banglanews24.com*. <https://www.banglanews24.com/opinion/news/bd/948051.details>.
- Islam, Nazrul. 2024. Questions you need to know about Proportional Representation Elections. *Prothom Alo*. <https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/column/crdhig6qo7>.
- Islam, Shafiqul. 2025. Disagreement Over the Election Method of Women's Reserved Seats. *Kalbela*. <https://www.kalbela.com/ajkerpatrika/firstpage/198235>.
- Jajaidin. 2025. Jamaat Wants Proportional Representation in Parliament. <https://www.jajaidinbd.com/politics/560072>.

- Jamuna TV. 2024. Election Commission's Recommendation to Hold Elections Under the PR Method. https://youtube.com/shorts/C31973_d4Po?si=USPB7Ds1WbYyUjCU.
- Jamuna TV. 2024. Several Parties Support Proportional Seat Distribution; BNP Objects. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aV55z-Kfw0U>.
- Kamal, Mahbub. 2024. The Proportional Representation System is Important for Restoring Democracy. <https://youtu.be/L2TBa0OY6wI?si=yQ7EBD9SmfY7d5Bo>.
- Karim, Rezaul. 2024. Discussion on Proportional Election System. *Prothom Alo*. <https://www.prothomalo.com/politics/9p5oxtliu7>.
- Khan, Mohibul Izdani. 2024. What Exactly is the Proportional Voting System? *Dhaka Tribune Bangla*. <https://bangla.dhakatribune.com/opinion/88150/আনুপাতিক-ভোট-পদ্ধতিটা-আসলেই-কি>.
- Mahabubs. 2024. What is an International Election? Which Countries Have International Elections? <https://www.mahabubs.com/2024/11/election.html>.
- Malik, Shahdeen. 2022. Proportional Election System Would Be Better. *Samakal*. <https://samakal.com/editorial/article/2206115684>.
- Mirza, Fakhrul. 2025. There Is No Question of Proportional Elections: Mirza Fakhrul. *Jugantor Report*. <https://www.jugantor.com/bnp/916441>.
- Misra, Udit. 2018. Why India's FPTP System Needs Urgent Reform. *The Wire*. <https://thewire.in>.
- Muha, Syed Abdullah. 2024. Proportional Election Demand Submitted to the Government. *Desh Rupantor*. <https://www.deshrupantor.com/545057>.
- N TV. 2025. Nurul Haque Nur Discusses Bicameral and PR Representation Elections on National Media. <https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1Ac6gySyRm/>.
- News Bangla 24. 2022. Proposal for Proportional Seats in Elections Has Been Taken Into Account by the CEC. <https://www.newsbangla24.com/news/200923/The-CEC-has-taken-into-account-the-proposal-of-proportional-seats>.
- Noman, Md. Abul. 2024. Concerns of Supporters and Opponents of Proportional Voting. *Protidiner Sangbad*. <https://www.protidinersangbad.com/todays-newspaper/uposompadokio/482907>.
- Nur, Nurul Haque. 2025. The Next Election Must Be Held on a Proportional Basis. *Somoy News*. <https://www.somoynews.tv/news/2025-02-28/QWz0uCG8>.
- Nur, Nurul Haque. 2025. The Next Election Must Be Held on a Proportional Basis. *Ittefaq*. <https://www.ittfaq.com.bd/amp/721413/আগামী-নির্বাচন-হতে-হবে-আনুপাতিক-হারে-নুর>.
- Pratibēdaka, Nijasba. 2024. Effective Way to Prevent Autocracy is Proportional Election. *Dhaka Mail*. <https://dhakamail.com/national/190988>.
- Priyo.com. 2024. Proportional Electoral System in Discussion. <https://m.priyo.com/e/5261596>.
- Prothom Alo. Why Are Various Political Parties Divided Over Demands? <https://youtu.be/qxslwr0FKQc?si=zz9HPhSrRquvC0Io>.
- Quader, Ghulam Muhammed. 2017. Proportional Representation Election Voting Method and the Bangladesh Context. <https://www.gmquader.com/আনুপাতিক-হারে-প্রতিনিধিত্ব>.
- Rahman, Hasan. 2024. Jamaat Wants Proportional Representation in Parliament. *Bangladesh Times*. <https://bangladeshtimes.com/details/80725>.
- Rizvi, Ruhul Kabir. 2024. 'Proportional Representation Means Encouraging Anti-Liberation Forces'. *ATN News*. <https://youtu.be/yawmRLe-XhY?si=Av24jT4km44iU8u>.
- Rizvi, Ruhul Kabir. 2024. Do People Understand the Concept of Proportional Elections? *The News 24*. <https://www.thenews24.com/country/news/28560>.
- Rizvi, Ruhul Kabir. 2024. No One Will Accept Any Conspiracy in the Name of Proportional Representation Election. *Ittefaq*. <https://www.ittfaq.com.bd/712268/আনুপাতিক-হারে-নির্বাচনের-নামে-কোনো-ষড়যন্ত্র-মানুষ>.
- Rizvi, Ruhul Kabir. 2024. People Have No Idea About Proportional Representation Election: Rizvi. *Jago News 24*. <https://www.jagonews24.com/politics/news/990843>.
- Rizvi, Ruhul Kabir. 2025. Proportional Elections Mean Supporting Anti-Liberation Forces: Rizvi. *Kaler Kantho*. <https://www.kalerkantho.com/online/Politics/2024/10/17/1436176>.
- Samakal. 2024. Proportional Representation Election as an Effective Way to Prevent Autocracy. <https://samakal.com/bangladesh/article/260240>.
- Sarkar, Dipak Kumar. 2024. Proportional Representation-Based Election is the Demand of the Time. *Jugantor*. <https://www.jugantor.com/tp-window/799747>.
- Shakil, Salman Tarek. 2024. Thoughts on National Elections by Proportional Representation: Which Path for BNP? *Bangla Tribune*. <https://www.banglatribune.com/politics/bnp/878369/আনুপাতিক-হারে-জাতীয়-নির্বাচনের-চিন্তা-বিএনপি-কোন>.
- Share Business 24. 2025. Major Disaster If Fair Election Not Ensured: Golam Parwar. <https://www.sharebusiness24.com/politics/news/38115>.
- Somoy TV. 2024. Why BNP Says No to Proportional Voting While Others Say Yes? https://youtu.be/AGt2q0GtNBs?si=Fvf_hg2-rgcFFC-I.
- Swapan, Harun Ur Rashid. 2024. Debate on Proportional Election System. *DW*. <https://www.dw.com/bn/সংখ্যানুপাতিক-নির্বাচন-ব্যবস্থা-নিষে-বিতর্ক/a-70542391>.
- The Business Standard. 2024. Why Do Small Parties Want Elections by Proportional Representation? <https://www.tbsnews.net/bangla/%E0%A6%AD%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A1%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%93/news-details-267621>.
- The Daily Star. 2024. Electoral Reform: Most Parties for Proportionate Representation. <https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/politics/news/electoral-reform-most-parties-proportionate-representation-3726401>.
- Titumir, Rashed Al Mahmud. 2025. Bicameral Parliament: How to Free the Grassroots from Dhaka-Centric Oligarchy. *Prothom Alo*. <https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/column/gfub8lifws>.
- Zamin, Manab. 2024. Selection of proportional method in discussion. <https://mzamin.com/news.php?news=131701#gsc.tab=0>.