

Research Article

Economic Governance of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through Domestic Trade (1945–1954)

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Abstract: This article analyzes the economic governance activities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam through the field of domestic trade during the period 1945–1954. Based on an examination of the State's guidelines, policies, and practices in organizing and managing the circulation and distribution of goods, the article clarifies the process by which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam gradually established and developed mechanisms for governing domestic trade in accordance with the prevailing economic conditions and the requirements of the resistance war. Domestic trade not only contributed to restoring and maintaining the operation of the domestic market but also served as an important instrument for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to regulate the circulation of goods, stabilize prices, and mobilize and allocate resources for production, people's livelihoods, and the resistance war. Through the management of domestic trade, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam gradually strengthened its capacity to organize, regulate, and control economic relations, thereby contributing to securing resources for the resistance war, strengthening the autonomy of the economy, and laying the initial foundations for state economic governance capacity under wartime conditions.

Keywords: economic governance; domestic trade; democratic republic of Vietnam; state capacity

1. Introduction

The success of the August Revolution in 1945 led to the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on September 2, 1945. However, shortly thereafter, on September 23, 1945, the French colonial forces launched an attack on Saigon, marking the beginning of their return to the invasion of Vietnam (Dinh Thị Thu Cúc, 2013: 32). On December 19, 1946, the nationwide resistance war broke out, bringing the country into a prolonged war that extended across the entire national territory¹. Under the impact of war, an economy that had long been dependent throughout the colonial period became even more difficult and precarious. Under these circumstances, the State was required not only to lead the resistance but also to develop its capacity for economic governance.

Research on the Vietnamese economy from 1945 to 1954 has attracted the attention of many scholars. Numerous monographs have examined the history of the Vietnamese economy and the history of Vietnamese commerce, focusing on various economic sectors, including agriculture, handicrafts, industry, and commerce in the DRV during the period 1945–1954 (Đặng 2005; Phạm 2003; Lê 1961; Nguyễn 1963; Lê 1969; Ministry of Domestic Trade 1981; Ministry of Industry and Trade 2022), as well as models of consumer cooperatives and state-owned trading in Vietnamese commerce during the period 1945–1954 (Lê 1959; Trần 1960). Other scholars have focused on clarifying the State's economic development orientations and financial and monetary policies in the DRV (Đào 1990; Đinh 2013; Nguyễn 2014). In studies of the wartime economy during the period 1945–1954, scholars have analyzed and explained the relationship between war and the economy, as well as the impact of war on economic development (Pethick 1915; Barro and Lee 1994; Organski and Kugler 1977, 1980; Rasler and Thompson 1985; Collier 1999; Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Koubi 2005). Others have examined the historical context and wartime conditions that influenced the DRV's economic development policies and policies for the development of commerce (Stein Tønnesson, 1991; David G. Marr, 1995; David W. P. Elliott, 2003; Pierre Brocheux & Daniel Hémerly, 2009; David G. Marr, 2013). From another perspective,

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¹ President Ho Chi Minh issued the *Appeal for a Nationwide Resistance War* (Lời kêu gọi toàn quốc kháng chiến)

scholars have examined the wartime economy in terms of how the DRV mobilized resources and financial resources to provide supplies for the Vietnamese army (Nguyễn 2008; Nguyễn 2013; Huff, G., 2015; Đăng 2015; Ruiz Estrada, Park and Kim 2016). It can be seen that scholars have approached the economy of the DRV during the period 1945–1954 from the perspectives of revolutionary warfare, state-building, resource mobilization, and the wartime economy, thereby addressing the role of commercial activities as a component of the economy. Most existing studies continue to regard domestic trade primarily as an economic sector or as a component of the economy. Previous studies have not yet analyzed domestic trade from the perspective of an instrument through which the DRV exercised its economic governance functions during the period 1945–1954.

The article demonstrates that domestic trade was not merely an activity involving the circulation of goods, but also an instrument of economic governance that enabled the DRV to regulate the market, mobilize resources, and strengthen its administrative capacity under wartime conditions. In terms of this new approach, the article does not examine the issue from the perspective of the history of commerce; rather, it analyzes domestic trade as an economic governance institution. This constitutes another original contribution of the study.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1 Materials

In addition to domestic and international scholarly studies on the history of the Vietnamese economy, the history of Vietnamese commerce, the wartime economy, and studies of the policies of the DRV during the period 1945–1954, this article draws on primary sources, including economic reports preserved at Vietnam's National Archives and Party and State documents of the DRV from this period. Drawing on these rich and diverse sources, the article ensures scientific rigor and objectivity and provides a clearer understanding of the research problem.

2.2 Methods

The article employs historical research in combination with policy analysis and systems approaches to clarify the process of economic governance by the State. Through the historical method, the article reconstructs the process by which the DRV established mechanisms for managing, regulating, and organizing the domestic market under the exceptional conditions of war. The analytical–synthetic method is used to identify the orientations, policies, and management instruments applied to domestic trade. At the same time, the historical comparative method is employed to clarify changes in the State's approach to economic governance across the two periods, 1945–1950 and 1951–1954, thereby demonstrating the transition from the initial restoration and regulation of the market to strengthened management and resource mobilization for the wartime economy. On this basis, the article approaches domestic trade not merely as a sphere of economic activity but also as an instrument of State governance, thereby contributing to an assessment of the formation and development of the DRV's capacity for economic governance during the early years of state-building and resistance.

3. Domestic Trade as an Instrument of Market Governance (1945–1950)

After its establishment, the DRV faced numerous challenges, including the consequences of the 1945 famine², the spread of war, disruptions to the circulation of goods, and the lack of control over the currency system. In this context, domestic trade became an important instrument through which the DRV exercised its economic governance functions. Through domestic trade, the DRV gradually developed modes of economic governance appropriate to the conditions of a wartime economy.

First, the DRV gradually established an administrative apparatus for managing domestic trade. Immediately after the August Revolution of 1945 broke out and succeeded, on August 28, 1945, the Provisional Government of the DRV established the *Ministry of National Economy (Bộ Kinh tế Quốc gia)* to perform the State's function of economic management. On January 1, 1946, the Ministry of National Economy was renamed the *Ministry of National Economy and People's Livelihood (Bộ Quốc dân Kinh tế)*. On March 2, 1946, the Ministry of National Economy and People's Livelihood was renamed the *Ministry of Economy (Bộ Kinh tế)* in order to concentrate resources for economic reconstruction and development in the DRV. The organizational structure of the Ministry of Economy was gradually consolidated, comprising the Department of Production Credit, the Industrial Production Council, the Department of Foreign Trade, the Department of Transport and Supply, the Department of Statistics, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Industry, and the Domestic Trade Office³ (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2022: 107–108). The establishment of an administrative apparatus for domestic trade provided the foundation for the State to directly govern the domestic market.

Next, the DRV gradually restored the network for the circulation of goods, organized a system of resistance markets and trade routes, while regulating supply and demand and stabilizing the market in areas under the control of the revolutionary government. On September 5, 1945, President Ho Chi Minh signed Decree No. 7/SL on ensuring freedom of trade in and transportation of paddy and rice. The DRV encouraged the production, transportation, and free trade of certain types of raw materials, including materials for paper production, pine resin, oil-bearing seeds, and leather materials. To encourage the circulation of goods in the market, the Government implemented a policy of free domestic trade. Merchants invested capital in business and promoted the exchange of goods among provinces and Interzones to meet the needs of the resistance, production, and the daily lives of the population. In addition, the DRV implemented a range of other economic policies and measures, including paying particular attention to repairing

² More than two million Vietnamese people died of starvation as a consequence of French colonial and Japanese fascist rule (from September 1940 to August 1945)

³ The Department of Production Credit was established under Decree No. 14/SL, dated February 3, 1947. It was responsible for managing and coordinating financial resources for domestic economic development and providing financial assistance and preferential capital to merchants to expand their businesses. The Industrial Production Council was established under Decree No. 23/SL, dated February 16, 1947. The Council was responsible for studying industrial production programs and plans, supervising their implementation, and advising the Ministry of Economy on matters related to industrial production.

and expanding transportation routes and developing means of transport. At the same time, it implemented a pricing policy that was beneficial to producers, transporters, and consumers. The DRV also allowed private individuals to exploit mines under appropriate conditions⁴. With regard to French and foreign capitalist companies, the DRV maintained a policy of allowing them to continue their business activities under State supervision (Đinh Thị Thu Cúc, 2013: 66–67, 138–139).

The DRV reformed traditional markets and established a system of resistance markets. A new market network extending from Interzone IV to the Việt Bắc was established, including the towns in the Việt Bắc; Buồng Cản, Đông Quan, Công Thần, Vân Đình, Đông Nam, Phát Diệm, and Cầu Yên in Interzone III; and Cầu Bó and Trảng Market in Interzone IV (Ministry of Industry and Trade, File Nos. 161 and 184, National Archives Center III). Markets were established in areas under the control of the revolutionary government, including Bằng Khẩu Market (Bắc Kạn), Định Hóa Market (Thái Nguyên), Phú Đình Market and markets in the Tân Trào area (Tuyên Quang), as well as traditional rural markets in the Việt Bắc; Quỳnh Nhai Market (Sơn La), Phong Thổ Market and Sinh Hồ Market (Lai Châu), as well as traditional rural markets in the Northwest; Rông Market (Nam Định), Viêng Market and rural markets in Interzone III; Bến Market (Thanh Hóa), Vinh Market (Nghệ An), Đông Hà Market (Quảng Trị), and rural markets in Interzone IV; and An Khê Market (Gia Lai), Ba Tơ Market (Quảng Ngãi), and markets in the mountainous areas of Quảng Nam in Interzone V.

From 1948 onward, French forces intensified their attacks and occupation of the provinces, resulting in the disruption of many transportation routes and the paralysis of trade flows. To overcome these difficulties and support commercial activities, the DRV encouraged “mass organizations and private individuals to make every effort to organize and pool capital to establish purchasing and selling cooperatives to supplement the Government’s supply efforts” (Communist Party of Vietnam, 1948: 48). After 1948, a movement to establish purchasing and selling cooperatives emerged in various localities. During this period, purchasing and selling cooperatives were tasked with: purchasing agricultural and forestry products as well as handicraft products from the population; supplying salt, textiles, kerosene, production tools, and other essential goods; limiting speculation, hoarding, and price manipulation; and serving as a bridge between producers and the State’s procurement agencies (Ministry of Industry and Trade, Files Nos. 18 and 384, National Archives Center III).

In addition, the DRV took measures to combat speculation, hoarding, and smuggling, while also introducing price regulations. The DRV strictly prohibited the speculation and hoarding of rice, and violators were subject to military law and the confiscation of their property. At certain points, the DRV had to implement measures such as price fixing, compulsory valuation, and mandatory declarations of paddy and rice stocks. Decree No. 85/SL, dated February 25, 1949, provided for price fixing and compulsory valuation. Subsequently, the Inter-Ministerial Decree of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Finance, dated June 16, 1949, stipulated that persons possessing three tons or more of paddy or one ton or more of rice were required to make a declaration. On August 30, 1949, the two ministries issued another decree lowering the threshold to 500 kilograms of paddy or 300 kilograms of rice or more that had to be declared, in order to address the shortage of rice. Through encouraging the free circulation of goods, the DRV was able to curb speculation and hoarding as well as the black market, while goods were gradually redistributed from areas of relative abundance to areas of scarcity.

Regarding prices, due to the increasingly complex wartime situation, commodity prices continued to rise. In 1950, rice prices increased by 600%–700% in the Việt Bắc and by 400% in Interzones III and IV (Ministry of Industry and Trade, File No. 99, National Archives Center III). To curb the rise in commodity prices, on February 25, 1949, the Government of the DRV issued Decree No. 8/SL, stipulating: “It is prohibited to sell goods essential to the livelihood of the population and the resistance effort at prices exceeding the maximum prices set by the Government” (Đặng Phong, 2002: 358). The DRV addressed the phenomenon of rapidly rising prices by encouraging the population to increase production and organizing supply operations. On the one hand, the DRV purchased paddy from the population and issued national bonds; on the other hand, it intensified supply operations to the Việt Bắc and Interzones III and IV (*See the detailed table below*):

Table 1: Quantities of Paddy and Salt Supplied to the Armed Forces, Government Agencies, and the Population

Interzones	Paddy (tons)	Salt (tons)
1947		
Việt Bắc	1.577	7,5
1948		
Việt Bắc	1.815	199
Interzone III ⁵	161	
Interzone IV ⁶	75,0	
1949		
Việt Bắc	6.809,6	382

⁴ On May 30, 1946, President Ho Chi Minh signed Decree No. 91, granting Mr. Đỗ Long Giang, the owner of a mine, the right to exploit coal in the 900-hectare Giáp Khẩu mining area in Hòn Gai for a period of 30 years. Upon receiving the license, Mr. Đỗ Long Giang was required to pay 9,000 Indochinese piastres into the public treasury. He was required to maintain an annual coal output of 20,000 tons and pay the State 2 piastres per ton. He was permitted to sell coal domestically; any export required authorization from the Government.

⁵ Hải Phòng, Kiến An, Thái Bình, Hưng yên, Hải Dương (https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li%C3%AAAn_khu)

⁶ Thanh Hóa, Nghệ An, Hà Tĩnh, Quảng Bình, Quảng Trị, Thừa Thiên (https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li%C3%AAAn_khu)

Interzone III	1.062,0	
Interzone IV	1.645,0	
1950		
Việt Bắc	24.370,0	330
Interzone III	6.804,0	
Interzone IV	10.935,0	

(Ministry of Industry and Trade, File Nos. 99 and 64, National Archives Center III)

Table 1 shows that the quantities of supplies provided by the DRV to the Việt Bắc and Interzones III and IV continuously increased from 1947 to 1950. Among these areas, the Việt Bắc received the largest amount of supplies.

To alleviate shortages of goods and raw materials, the Department of Foreign Trade was established in early 1947. Due to the complex military situation and difficulties in maintaining contact with the outside, foreign trade activities focused on purchasing goods from areas under temporary occupation. From late 1948, Supply Offices were established in Bắc Ninh, Bắc Giang, Phú Thọ, Hà Đông, Thanh Hóa, Bình Trị Thiên, and other areas (Ministry of Industry and Trade, File No. 64, National Archives Center III). The Supply Offices were responsible for procuring goods essential to the resistance, actively transporting paddy, rice, and salt to secure areas, particularly by purchasing essential goods from areas under temporary occupation. In 1949, the Supply Offices exported goods valued at 74,550,000 đồng and imported goods valued at 65,936,000 đồng; in 1950, they exported goods valued at 272,320,000 đồng and imported goods valued at 603,320,000 đồng (Ministry of Industry and Trade, File No. 99, National Archives Center III). Through various proactive measures, particularly the promotion of increased production, the price situation gradually improved and continued to decline thereafter.

These activities demonstrate that the DRV primarily employed domestic trade as an instrument of market governance, with the aim of restoring the economy and consolidating the revolutionary government. On the one hand, the State maintained and restored the network for the circulation of goods among localities, between rural and urban areas, and between free zones⁷ and resistance base areas⁸. On the other hand, the DRV gradually regulated the market, particularly with regard to essential goods, through price management, control of speculation, and the regulation of the circulation of goods. During the period 1945–1950, the DRV prioritized market stabilization in order to ensure the livelihood of the population and sustain the resistance economy.

4. Domestic Trade in the Mobilization and Distribution of Resources for the Resistance (1951–1954)

Following the Border Victory in 1950, the Vietnamese revolutionary forces shifted from a defensive to a counteroffensive posture. The Vietnamese army successively launched campaigns of varying scale, including the Trần Hưng Đạo Campaign, Hoàng Hoa Thám Campaign, Quang Trung Campaign, Hòa Bình Campaign, Northwest Campaign, Upper Laos Campaign, and Điện Biên Phủ Campaign. The liberated areas continued to expand, and transportation between resistance bases was gradually restored, facilitating the circulation of goods and creating more favorable conditions for the development of domestic trade. Alongside the launch of military campaigns, the DRV had to ensure supplies of food, medicines, and clothing for these campaigns. Domestic trade thus became an instrument for mobilizing and distributing resources in support of the resistance.

Through domestic trade, the DRV carried out the procurement of agricultural products and mobilized food supplies. To organize and expand the procurement of agricultural products in free zones and resistance base areas, in 1951, the DRV established the state-owned trading system (mậu dịch quốc doanh) under Decree No. 22/SL, dated May 14, 1951. The establishment of state-owned trading was intended to perform the following tasks:

1. Providing supplies for the needs of the armed forces and government agencies;
2. Regulating the market and stabilizing prices;
3. Supporting the development of production and guiding and assisting merchants in serving the resistance and meeting the needs of the population;
4. Conducting economic struggle against counter-revolutionary forces (Ministry of Domestic Trade, File No. 17, National Archives Center III).

The DRV organized the Central State Trading Service and established four state-owned trading establishments in the four Interzones, subsequently expanding the establishment of state-owned trading establishments in Interzone V and Southern Vietnam. The number of stores exceeded 100, with more than 4,000 employees. The state-owned trading system carried out the procurement of goods from the population. From 1951 to 1954, the volume of goods procured by state-owned trading increased steadily. In 1951, state-owned trading procured goods from the population worth 2,800 million đồng, equivalent to 9,000 tons of paddy; in 1952, 27,000 million đồng, equivalent to 18,000 tons of paddy; and in 1953, 38,000 million đồng, equivalent to 35,000 tons of paddy (Ministry of Industry and Trade, File No. 99, National Archives Center III). The volume of goods sold on the market through state-owned trading also increased annually (See the detailed table below):

⁷ Free zones” refer to areas that were stably controlled by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and resistance forces, and that were not—or were only minimally—subject to direct control by French military forces. In this sense, the concept of “free zones” also encompasses resistance base areas, which were territories under relatively firm control of the DRV and resistance forces, where leadership institutions and armed forces were concentrated, and where economic development and the consolidation of rear-base support structures were actively undertaken.

⁸ “Resistance base areas” (also referred to as revolutionary base areas) are territories organized, developed, and controlled by revolutionary forces to serve as long-term bases for the resistance, supporting military, political, economic, and logistical activities.

Table 2: Quantities of Textiles, Paddy, and Salt Sold on the Market through State-Owned Trading

	1951	1952	11-1953
Index of Textiles Sold on the Market through State-Owned Trading	100%	270%	290%
Index of Paddy Sold on the Market through State-Owned Trading	100%	3.200%	4.300%
Index of Salt Sold on the Market through State-Owned Trading	100%	1.300%	1.330%

(Ministry of Industry and Trade, File No. 161, National Archives Center III)

Table 2 shows that the quantities of textiles, paddy, and salt sold through state-owned trading increased rapidly from 1951 to 1953. Among these commodities, paddy recorded the largest and fastest increase, followed by salt. In the major markets, state-owned trading accounted for 70% of the total rice supply and 50% of the total salt supply on the market. This indicates that the purchasing power of the population was increasing and that shortages of goods in the market were gradually being alleviated.

State-owned trading made an important contribution to price stabilization and market regulation. Under wartime conditions, when goods were scarce and supply was insufficient to meet demand, the prices of essential commodities such as rice, textiles, and salt rose sharply. By procuring and stockpiling goods, state-owned trading was able to release them onto the market and stabilize prices in a timely manner. Beginning in 1953, state-owned trading succeeded in significantly lowering prices, with rice prices falling by 20–40%. The gap between the prices of industrial products and agricultural products also gradually narrowed considerably.

Table 3: Comparison of the Price Gap between Industrial Products and Agricultural Products

	1948	1954
The price of one meter of textile was equivalent to the price of	19 kg of rice	4,7 kg of rice
The price of one liter of kerosene was equivalent to the price of	17,5 kg of rice	4,3 kg of rice
The price of one notebook was equivalent to the price of	6 kg of rice	1,4 kg of rice

(Ministry of Domestic Trade, File No. 17, National Archives Center III)

Table 3 shows that the price gap between industrial products and agricultural products was very large in 1948. However, by 1954, this price gap had narrowed considerably. This demonstrates the efforts made by the DRV to promote production and stabilize prices.

At the same time, the DRV promoted the development of purchasing and selling cooperatives in free zones and resistance base areas. Purchasing and selling cooperatives were established more widely across various free zones, including the Việt Bắc, Interzones III and IV, and several localities in Southern Vietnam. The development of these cooperatives followed several directions: closely coordinating with the state-owned trading system in the procurement and distribution of goods; participating in price stabilization, combating speculation, and ensuring the circulation of goods under wartime conditions; establishing retail outlets to serve the population in rural areas and resistance bases; and mobilizing goods from the population to supply the armed forces, resistance agencies, and production sectors (Ministry of Industry and Trade, Files Nos. 18 and 184, National Archives Center III). Paddy and rice, maize, sweet potatoes, cassava, salt, meat, fish, and other agricultural products were procured through purchasing and selling cooperatives.

Through domestic trade, the DRV coordinated the distribution of goods to support the armed forces during military campaigns. Under wartime conditions, shortages and the geographical dispersion of goods could directly affect the fighting capacity of the armed forces. Therefore, the DRV prioritized the distribution of certain essential commodities to the armed forces and resistance agencies. The DRV coordinated the supply of essential goods for the troops, including foodstuffs, textiles, clothing, medicines, household supplies, production tools, and other military provisions. Goods circulation routes were organized and adjusted according to the situation on the battlefield. Areas near resistance zones, bases, and strategic transport routes were given priority for procurement, stockpiling, and the transportation of goods.

State-owned trading supplied essential goods to the troops engaged in combat, including rice, salt, vegetables, meat, dried fish, sugar, beans, medicines, and a portion of military uniforms, equipment, and supplies. It also prepared goods at locations where large numbers of troops and volunteer youth were concentrated. In addition, state-owned trading prepared goods for immediate distribution to the population in newly liberated areas following each military victory of the Vietnamese Army (Ministry of Domestic Trade, File No. 17, National Archives Center III).

It can be seen that domestic trade became an instrument for mobilizing wartime resources, thereby contributing to strengthening the DRV's organizational capacity. Whereas during the period 1945–1950, the DRV prioritized market stabilization to ensure the livelihood of the population and sustain the resistance economy, during the period 1951–1954, domestic trade became an instrument for mobilizing national resources rather than merely an activity involving the circulation of goods. This represents a manifestation of economic governance under wartime conditions.

5. Conclusion

Domestic trade was an important economic governance institution of the DRV. The period 1945–1954 was a time when the DRV had to both build an independent economy after gaining political power and organize and secure resources for the resistance. Through policies aimed at restoring the market, regulating prices, controlling the circulation of goods, and mobilizing resources, the DRV gradually strengthened its capacity for economic governance under wartime conditions, while also establishing an institutional foundation for the development of state-owned trading.

Through the practical management of domestic trade, the DRV's capacity for economic governance was gradually formed and consolidated. This capacity was reflected, first, in its ability to formulate and implement policies for market regulation; second, in its ability to organize commercial networks and coordinate the distribution of goods among localities; and third, in its ability to combine State management instruments with networks for the circulation of goods. On this basis, the DRV gradually established mechanisms for managing the circulation of goods that were appropriate to the conditions of a wartime economy, thereby both ensuring the essential consumption needs of the population and prioritizing the concentration of resources for the resistance.

Domestic trade played an important role in maintaining the functioning of the economy, regulating the market, mobilizing resources, and strengthening the State's capacity for economic governance. By organizing the circulation of goods among different regions, ensuring the supply of essential necessities, stabilizing prices, and mobilizing goods for the resistance, domestic trade contributed to sustaining the operation of the economy, meeting the needs of the population, maintaining social stability, and securing part of the resources required for the armed forces and national defense. In particular, the management of domestic trade enabled the State to accumulate experience in policy formulation, institutional organization, coordination among different levels and sectors, and mobilization of the participation of various economic sectors, thereby gradually strengthening its capacity for economic governance and economic regulation.

Alongside these achievements, the management of domestic trade during the period 1945–1954 also revealed a number of limitations. These included shortages of goods, price fluctuations, speculation, smuggling, limited capacity for procurement and coordination of goods, disruptions to transportation, and a lack of synchronization in management and coordination. Nevertheless, given the exceptional historical circumstances of a newly established state that had to wage a prolonged resistance, the achievements in organizing and managing domestic trade were of considerable significance.

From a historical perspective, domestic trade should therefore not be viewed merely as an economic sector, but rather as a space for the practice of economic governance by the DRV. It was through the organization of the circulation of goods, market regulation, and the mobilization and distribution of resources that the DRV gradually developed experience, instruments, and capacity for managing the economy under wartime conditions. This constitutes an important dimension for understanding the process of state-building and the development of Vietnam's capacity for economic governance during the early years of independence (1945–1954), while also laying the foundation for more profound transformations in the mechanisms of economic management in subsequent periods.

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